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  Economics has evolved significantly since the 1950s, both in what it covers and 
the approaches it uses. Whereas the applied policy economics through the 1950s could 
reasonably be called neoclassical, modern economics has outgrown that classification. Its 
approach is more eclectic, and its applied policy models are not required to adhere to the 
assumptions that Solow calls the holy trinity--rationality, equilibrium, and greed. (See 
Kreps (1997) for a discussion.)  
  The welfare economics underlying applied policy has not evolved at the same 
pace. We still teach students, and implicitly base policy discussions on, a welfare 
economics that evolved out of the neoclassical mold-built on a foundation of Pareto 
optimality, externalities, and Walrasian general equilibrium. The essence of that welfare 
economics for pedagogical purposes is captured in Abba Lerner’s “economic of control” 
metaphor. In it economists’ underlying general equilibrium model, based on the holy 
trinity, serves as a map for the economy; the applied policy problem is to get a workable 
steering wheel on the car, a reasonable driver, and decent linkages. In essence the goal is 
to design policy, or, in sophisticated presentations, policy rules, to get the car to follow 
the map. In a nutshell: theory points out the way to go; applied policy deals with getting 
you there.  
In the economics of control vision the Arrow Debreu McKenzie Walrasian general 
equilibrium model provides the correct set of prices or targets. (In advanced models, the 
target prices could be specified as dynamic stochastic variables.) The job of applied 
policy economists is to specify those prices with their model and to design general rules 
of policy, and policy instruments, to achieve those prices.  Complexity, Pedagogy, and the Economics of Muddling Through 
Recent work in complexity science, which sees the economy as a complex system 
such as that found in Arthur, Durlauf, and Lane (1997) suggests a different welfare 
framework within which to consider applied policy. This complexity work is part of a 
broader shift away from the holy trinity that is occurring in modern economics. In applied 
work, and in some theoretical work, more general assumptions are replacing the more 
narrowly specified holy trinity assumptions. Specifically, more general forms of 
purposeful behavior are replacing simple "greed"; cognitive awareness is replacing 
simple rationality; and sustainability is replacing simple equilibrium. In the complexity 
approach the economy is thought of as a self-organizing system that structures 
communication patterns among agents.
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The work done at CeNDEF (http://www.fee.uva.nl/cendef) is an example of the 
approach we have in mind. Researchers there are combining new and old strategies to 
address fundamental questions. For example their theoretical work is calibrated to 
reproduce many features of real world data, but is based on heterogeneous agents with 
differing degrees of rationality, rather than on homogeneous agents. Their choice of 
assumptions is further governed by experimental and econometric work using field data. 
They study how changing the degree (e.g., the "dial") of rationality creates dynamical 
patterns in their artificial economies, which are then compared to dynamical patterns 
observed in actual economies. They use complexity tools such as bifurcation theory to 
study these pattern-generating mechanisms analytically as well as computationally. 
Viewing the economy as a complex system suggests the need for some 
modifications in the underlying welfare foundations for applied policy work. The “right 
price” economic of control view of applied policy does not fit the complexity approach. 
The complexity approach places more emphasis on the "right price process" rather than 
the "right price". The complexity approach also differs from earlier approaches that took 
complexity seriously, such as the "Austrian" approach. That Austrian approach also 
stressed the "right price process" view of policy, but it was perceived as opposing formal 
modeling and econometric work. The modern complexity approach is intricately involved 
in modeling and econometric work. It uses computationally assisted model building, 
analytics, and econometrics, to move the discussion in a more quantitative direction than 
that favored by Austrians. It pushes mathematical methods to the limit, using analytical 
and computational tools such as bifurcation theory, interacting systems theory, and 
hierarchies of temporal and spatial scales. 
Even with these methods the complexity approach does not achieve the 
understanding needed to base policy on the “right price” view. If the economy is a 
complex system there is no definitive map for the economy. Novelty may continually 
develop, making the economy, in a fundamental sense, non-ergodic. When working on 
microfoundations of complex systems, researchers must pay close attention to issues like 
temporal and spatial variations in the interconnection structure of the economy and the 
potential of such issues to create abrupt and "surprising" changes.  
                                                           
1 Defining complexity is too complex a task to deal with here, other than to say that we are here using an 
inclusive definition that includes a variety of different approaches. For a discussion of the definition of 
complexity see Brock (2000a) and Arthur, Durlauf and Lane (1997). 
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When one faces seriously the econometric problems of identifying the "true" 
causal pathways in a system with important observable and unobservable heterogeneity 
at various temporal and spatial scales (where "space" is taken in the wide sense) the best 
policy makers can do is to determine temporary patterns that may allow for exploitable 
policy opportunities while keeping a careful outlook for the potential of "surprises". To 
prepare students to deal with the complexity modern researchers are dealing with, we 
need to teach them a welfare economics that allows for that complexity. We call this 
modified approach to welfare economics the economics of muddling through because 
muddling through is, in the immediate future, the best one can hope for as a policy 
objective.  
In this paper we offer some initial explorations of how the welfare foundations of 
economic policy might change if welfare theory started from the premise that the 
economy is a complex system. Our discussion is directed at non-specialists in 
complexity. Its purpose is to provide some insight into why the complexity revolution is 
more than the latest toy of mathematical economists-more than a method of increasing 
the mathematical complexity of studying economics. It has, we argue, important policy 
implications that will make a difference in how applied policy economist work, the 
methods they use, and how they think about their policy work.  
Specifically, we discuss four types of changes in applied policy that we believe 
follow from this complexity foundation. They are:  
1) Changes in the degree of certainty with which policy advice is presented.  
2) Changes in the methods of examining policy alternatives. 
3) Changes in the nature of the policy questions asked.  
4) Changes in the nature of the general policy solutions. 
Before we explore these we briefly discuss the way in which modern economics 
uses welfare economics in practice. 
How Modern Economics uses Welfare Economics in Practice 
  Modern economics is very much about policy. The majority of economists are 
applied economists who see their job as taking received economic wisdom embodied in a 
set of canonical models and applying that wisdom to specific cases. That application is 
highly empirical, and, by mathematical standards, not very formal, although to a 
humanist, it certainly looks formal. Robert Solow (1997) has captured the essence of the 
current approach with his “loose fitting positivism” terminology. He writes:  
Today, if you ask a mainstream economist a question about almost any aspect of 
economic life, the response will be: suppose we model that situation and see what 
happens....There are thousands of examples; the point is that modern mainstream 
economics consists of little else but examples of this process. (p. 43) 
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The positivism of modern economics is embodied in its focus on empirical testing 
and its methodological adherence to the separation of positive and normative elements. It 
is “loose fitting” positivism because the actual policy models used often have only a 
slight connection to the pure theoretical models that currently form the general 
equilibrium core of the theory of welfare economics. The theoretical welfare models 
provide the framework for thinking about policy, but that framework is not seen as 
limiting the assumptions made in the actual applied policy models.  
Modern microeconomics uses an eclectic set of models that employ a variety of 
assumptions and methods. For example, the formal general equilibrium model provides 
no learning by doing, or feedback of activity on tastes; it takes tastes as a primitive. 
Applied policy models, however, such as those of Robert Frank (1999),can take tastes as 
a variable. Another example concerns rationality; formal general equilibrium models 
assume strong rationality; many applied policy models assume bounded rationality when 
that assumption provides a better fit with the data. George Akerlof’s (1993) cognitive 
dissonance model of interrelationships and Robert Solow’s (1990) sociological model of 
the labor market are examples. Yet another example is in finance where psychological 
assumptions are replacing strong rationality assumption. This has occurred so much that 
Richard Thaler (1999) argues, that soon, “the term ‘behavioral finance’ will be correctly 
viewed as a redundant phrase. What other kind of finance is there?”  
The “tight fitting positivism” limitations on applied policy modeling, requiring 
the assumptions of applied policy models to be consistent with the assumptions of the 
formal general equilibrium core, are gone. In modern applied policy the choice of 
assumptions are generally made on empirical grounds: if it provides a better fit with the 
data, especially out-of-sample data, while maintaining a tractable model, it is a better 
model.  
These examples demonstrate a major split that has developed between most 
formal general equilibrium models, where assumptions are generally chosen to create 
global tractability, and applied policy models, where assumptions are generally chosen to 
create a type of local model tractability, but still achieve an empirical fit with the 
evidence.  
The differing assumptions of core general equilibrium theories and applied policy 
models presents a consistency problem for the welfare foundations of applied economics. 
Economists’ detailed work on welfare theory, and the standard welfare propositions that 
follow from that work, can serve as a firm basis of applied policies only for those tight-
fitted models that share the assumptions of its formal general equilibrium core. Applied 
policy models using different assumptions from the formally developed general 
equilibrium theory must implicitly make a robustness assumption if the welfare theory 
associated with that general equilibrium theory is to serve as a backdrop for policy. 
Loose fitting positivism requires strong robustness assumptions. 
  The eclectic modeling, applied policy approach has evolved over the last thirty 
years as micro economists reacted to objections that it was too concerned with pure 
theory and logical models. It is a pragmatic approach that has been fought by purists, 
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who have pointed out the above-mentioned consistency problem. Purists argue that the 
eclectic models are ad hoc and unreliable; they argue that all applied work should use the 
same assumptions as the developed core general equilibrium theory: If you use the 
welfare theory, you should use the holy trinity of assumptions upon which it is based. 
The pragmatic approach developed, nonetheless, because of the usefulness of these 
eclectic, ad hoc models and the generally perceived failure of purists to provide 
acceptable real-world policy linkages in the absence of such ad hoc models.  
  For example, consider DeLong's "What's Wrong with Our Bloody Economies?" 
(http://econ161.berkeley.edu/ created 1/11/98) where he discusses recent financial crises 
and footloose capital movements. He states: "The root cause of the crises is a sudden 
change of state in international investors' opinions. Like a herd of not-very-smart cattle, 
they all were going one way in 1993 or 1996, and then they turned around and are all 
going the opposite way today...The correct answer....the market was manic....not a cool 
judgment of changing fundamentals but instead a sudden psychological victory of fear 
over greed." After a discussion of the enormous benefits of free flowing capital, while 
mentioning caveats about the problems (like the above) caused by such enormous 
amounts of footloose capital DeLong suggests we look at three basic policy rules coined 
by W. Bagehot long ago: (i) Make Lenders of Last Resort available; (ii) Make it painful 
to be bailed out; (iii) Don't bail anyone out unless they are solvent if there were not a 
panic.  
Whether one agrees with DeLong or not, it is hard to find better guidance than 
Bagehot's from our conventional textbook general equilibrium model towards a useful 
policy posture in financial panic management. This is not to say that we cannot model it 
in intertemporal general equilibrium models. With jump variables (e.g. Turnovsky (1995) 
one can create patterns that look like "panics" but are, in fact, just rational expectations 
equilibrium responses to changes in underlying fundamental parameters unobservable to 
the econometrician. But in financial panic management the abrupt changes in asset prices 
and the magnitude of financial movements seem difficult to link to any financial rational 
expectations "jump variable" at the "right" time scale.  
Complexity models of financial asset pricing with social interactions (e.g. Brock 
(1993)) provide a better fit with DeLong and Bahehot’s educated common sense policy 
precepts. They stress the ability of observable and unobservable correlations propagated 
through the financial community's interaction structure to create not only alternative 
states but also lightning quick changes of state via a breakdown of the usual smoothing 
effects of something like a Law of Large Numbers.  
Writers like Prigogine have stressed the link between breakdowns of phenomena 
like Laws of Large Numbers and complexity-type behavior such as bifurcations and 
emergent structures for years. See for example, his paper in Day and Chen (1993). These 
abrupt changes can be triggered by minute unobservables undetectable by an observing 
scientist. Basically this phenomenon happens because a certain infinite series of 
appropriate "spatial" cross correlations amongst agents fails to converge absolutely in a 
large system of agents. This type of complexity-based approach to studying asset pricing 
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and trading volume seems to be appropriate in our huge highly interconnected (via "on 
line" trading engines and news feeds) financial trading system assisted by current 
electronics. 
   In our view the problem of current applied theory is not so much that it is ad hoc 
and does not follow a particular model, e.g. the extended general equilibrium model 
faithfully. The problem is that it too closely ties its welfare foundation to the current 
general equilibrium core without modifying that core to include complexity-based 
features like a temporal/spatial hierarchy of interconnective elements amongst the agents. 
These elements can create "policy surprises" in the real world that the core is not good at 
training the analyst to watch out for. To help solve the problem we suggest that loose 
fitting positivism be replaced by loose fitting pragmatism, based upon a broader 
complexity view of the economy. Loose fitting pragmatism starts from the proposition 
that any model is inherently ad hoc, but it attempts to limit that adhocness and take it into 
account in its policy advice.  
Let us now turn to four differences we see following from seeing welfare 
economics as a type of muddling through, rather than as part of the economics of control.  
1) Changes in the degree of certainty with which policy advice is presented.  
Above, we argued that there is often a false sense of connection between the 
policy advice economists give based on ad hoc models and the underlying welfare 
economics. In the complexity welfare framework that connection is given up. Pure theory 
can say very little definitively about complex systems. It may be able to add insights to 
intuition; it may temporarily provide an acceptable fit upon which one can tentatively 
base policy. But there always remains an underlying uncertainty-the possibility that the 
system might change in ways that cannot be currently modeled or created-that must be 
taken into account in designing policy. In complexity uncertainty is part of the core 
theory. Currently, in much applied policy work, while uncertainty is recognized, it often 
is not given much weight. Specifically, we suggest that uncertainty has an important 
implication for policy design and policy focus, as we will discuss below.  
Our argument is not that we have to throw out all current work that is based on 
the current general equilibrium core. It is simply that standard welfare economics 
underlying applied policy work gives too much reverence to it. Loose fitting pragmatism 
allows the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie Walrasian general equilibrium core to be used, but 
without the reverence. It is useful in guiding models in those cases where the 
assumptions provide an acceptable match to reality. But the complexity approach also 
allows the use of other currently implicit general equilibrium models with different 
assumptions. In short the general equilibrium cores is seen as a useful, pragmatic model, 
and not as the single model that defines the core assumptions that must be used. 
Theoretical researchers are currently working on broadening and modifying the 
benchmark Arrow Debreu model. But no clearly defined alternatives have been 
developed, and without a clearly defined alternative, the Arrow Debreu model has 
remained the benchmark of welfare economics.  
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Integrating this uncertainty into applied policy will require new techniques such 
as computational Bayesian techniques and Bayesian Model Averaging (e.g. Geweke 
(1999), Brock and Durlauf (2000b), Brock and Carpenter (2000a)). Technically, these 
new techniques allow for the possibility of data to speak to the presence of alternative 
stable states and to the measure the added impact of this possibility upon the posterior 
distribution of welfare measures in a dynamical system where alternative stable states are 
a serious potential possibility. 
  The advantage of a Bayesian framework is that it produces automatically, as a 
byproduct, a theory of the burden of proof in the form of a potential precautionary 
principle in the quantitative form of a Bayesian posterior welfare distribution. For 
example Pizer (1996) produces a quantitative expression for how much the case for 
caution in climate change policy is strengthened when uncertainty is taken into account. 
The uncertainty in the evidence leads to a strengthened case (relative to "best-guess" 
parameter values) for emission reductions and to an increased preference for flexible 
regulatory/management modes and gives a quantitative expression for each. 
  Brock and Durlauf (2000b) and Brock and Carpenter (2000a) have considered a 
start on this kind of work in the context of growth econometrics and dynamic 
management of ecosystems by using formal treatments of model uncertainty in the 
Bayesian literature. As shown by Brock and Durlauf (2000b) adjustment for model 
uncertainty (even when that uncertainty is constrained by theory) as well as Knightian 
Uncertainty causes an increase in the level of modesty which is probably appropriate 
when giving advice given our current level of science. It also allows data to speak to 
theoretical debates in a statistically sensible way by forcing each side to submit a model 
class that represents their theory to a Bayes type procedure that allows the data to attach 
posterior odds to the truth of each theory. Computational advances have now allowed 
such methods to be operationalized. Brock and Carpenter (2000) use a dynamic treatment 
where there is the complicating factor of two-way feedback between the management and 
the model selection and estimation process with the extra complication of possible 
alternative stable states in the underlying system dynamics. 
  It is likely that adjustment for uncertainty in the more realistic manner being 
suggested here will strengthen the case for adaptive management based upon monitoring 
of "expert leading indicators of systemic health." In ecology this would mean focusing 
policy analysis on populations of organisms sensitive to changes of relevant state and 
especially informative organism populations signatory of an impending "poised"-"near 
bifurcational" state. In economies it might mean focusing policy analysis on certain 
sociological indicators, such as suicides of youth, surveys and other measures of 
"wellbeing" as stressed by the hedonic economic psychologists cited in Frank (1999) to 
estimate when the anomie of a system has increased to a near bifurcation state. It 
suggests that applied economists should develop continuously updated quantitative value 
indices of such leading indicators presented in a form for immediate use by policymakers 
who must face compromise tradeoffs and who must face the decision whether the gains 
from a policy change are worth the costs of promoting it. 
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The complexity foundation to welfare economics also has some more general 
implications for thinking about the advantages of market systems. Specifically, it 
presents modified welfare foundations for markets than those suggested by standard 
welfare theory. For example simulations and analytics (cf. SFI II) suggest that, complex 
systems can self-organize, after application of policy action, in surprising ways in 
contrast to the predictions of conventional comparative statics exercises. They can also 
manage quite well--going along as they have gone along with no central controller. In 
such cases there is a slight status quo (not a perfectly competitive market) bias in the 
complexity approach because the status quo has, by its existence, shown that it is a 
feasible solution. Other states may not be. (For a discussion see Brock and Colander 
(2000).)  
Whether the status quo is optimal in any sense is a much harder question since 
many equilibria are possible. Moreover, as we will discuss below, global optimality is 
reduced in importance when taking a complexity perspective as other attributes, such as 
resilience and sustainability, are directly considered as policy goals.  
2) Changes in the methods of modeling policy alternatives 
If less certainty were all one could say about the policy implications of 
complexity, it would not be worth discussing. But approaching policy from a complexity 
framework does more than simply build in the uncertainty of policy. It suggests 
significantly different methods be used in designing policy, and in designing policy 
research. Let us list and briefly discuss some of the most important of these.  
More use of nonlinear dynamics and recursive mathematics. 
The first difference between modeling in the standard approach and modeling in a 
complexity approach is that complexity approach is the mathematics used. Complexity 
focuses more on non-linear dynamics and recursive mathematics than does the standard 
approach. Non-linear models typically lead to multiple equilibria, sunspot, and path-
dependent models involving sudden regime shifts. Thus, these models are more 
emphasized in the complexity work. Standard applied economics gets to these type of 
models, but the path is not so direct, and it is only with reluctance. (Schumpeter (1954) 
argued that unique equilibrium models were essential to doing economics as a science.)  
Consistent with the use of these techniques there would be a stronger focus of 
theoretical work on model and equilibrium selection mechanisms, as well as broader 
dynamic concepts of equilibrium. (See Blume (1997), Brock and Durlauf (2000a), and  
Brock (2000b). 
More Focus on computational work 
The difference in mathematics used is associated with another important 
difference in approach. Researchers using a complexity approach to economics are more 
willing to use techniques that provide insight into issues but do not lead to full analytic 
solutions. The reason standard economics does not use non-linear mathematics is that 
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such models are generally analytically intractable. Whereas in standard approaches 
analytic tractability is a key component, in the complexity approach, analytic tractability 
is not an absolute requirement because now computational advances have been made that 
allow us to deal with economic models closer to the complex systems that may permeate 
real economies (Judd (1998)). 
More use of Simulations and Agent based models.  
In standard economics, computational methods are used to gain insight into 
general equilibrium issues (i.e. computable general equilibrium models) The complexity 
approach suggests a broader role for computational methods. It sees important insights 
into the problems being gained via simulations and agent-based modeling starting from 
scratch. In essence one “grows” the economy rather than formally models it. Such agent-
based modeling is a quite different approach to thinking about policy. There is increasing 
interest in agent-based computational economics (ACE), the computational study of 
economies modeled as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents. (See 
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm). Agent-based modeling presents a whole 
new set of problems; solving them is central to the complexity approach to welfare 
economics, whereas they are tangential to standard welfare economics. 
Assumptions are Determined Empirically to Fit the Data  
All the above differences are associated with a difference in the way one 
conceives of designing a model. In the standard approach one designs a model 
deductively, following core assumptions. The complexity approach eliminates any 
particular general equilibrium model as the background-coordinating model of the 
economy and replaces it with a broader set of, often-implicit, general equilibrium models 
whose assumptions are determined through backward through induction from the 
assumptions that fit the data in applied policy work. An example here is the work of 
Brock and Hommes (1998) in their work on alternatives to the efficient market 
hypothesis. In that work they explore the implications of the heterogeneous market 
hypothesis.  
In the complexity approach both abstract theory and simulation work provide 
stories that are used to check the compatibility of narrower applied-policy stories that 
form the basis of applied policy work. In the complexity approach the core general 
equilibrium model must be designed to be consistent with the applied policy work, not 
the other way around. For example, if applied policy work suggests that positional 
consumption goods are important, then we need the core to include assumptions that 
allow positional consumption. That unknown core should be given as much initial weight 
in policy choice as is current general equilibrium propositions. 
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By using the Bayesian Model Averaging tools used in Brock and Durlauf 
(2000b), as well as the integration of econometrical and theoretical tools of "Interactions-
Based Models" (e.g., Brock and Durlauf (2000a), one could attach posterior odds to 
modifications of that core, and possibly model dealing with unknown parts of the "true 
core" by formal treatments of "ambiguity" like Knightian Uncertainty.
2
Justifying Assumptions 
The ability to choose assumptions to fit with applied work’s focus on relating 
theory to data does not provide a free ride. Along with that flexibility comes a set of 
limitations on assumptions and a reduction in the degree of certainty attached to the 
model; assumptions cannot be chosen in an ad hoc manner; each must be justified as 
being appropriate. Justification of ad-hoc assumptions is often missing in current applied 
work even though the assumptions often differ from general equilibrium assumptions, 
creating the consistency problem discussed above. The acceptance of the need for 
justification would make the consistency problem a key issue in discussions of policy 
models, and hence would represent a major change in how applied-policy work is done.  
The new methods discussed above, such as agent based modeling, offer one way 
of justifying assumptions. There are others, including experimental work--showing that 
the assumption is consistent with how people actually behave--and importing behavioral 
assumptions that have been developed by researchers in experimental and behavioral 
psychology. 
Four desirable requirements for assumptions used in policy models include the 
following:  
(1) Intuitive plausibility 
In complexity, one does not use induction or deduction; instead one uses a 
combination of the two--what the pragmatist, Charles Pierce, called abduction. In 
abduction the best one can do in theory is to tell intuitively plausible stories. Notice that 
this is a quite different use of intuitive plausibility than that found in the calibration 
literature. In that literature the assumptions need not be intuitively plausible; the 
intuitively plausibility focus is on the ability of the calibrated models to reproduce 
relevant empirical regularities. That requirement still exists but the additional 
requirement that fits the complexity approach is that the model’s assumptions reasonably 
match the assumed characteristics of the agents in the observable system. Thus, we would 
argue that representative agent models in macro-economic work do not meet the intuitive 
plausibility requirement, even if they can be calibrated to the relevant empirical 
regularities because (i) researchers have essentially harvested already most of the useful 
macro economic insights available from such models; and (ii) the "Gorman" type 
conditions for existence of such an "as if" agent, even if extended to some type of large 
system limit framework, do not seem all that promising to add future value, especially 
                                                           
2 See Brock and Durlauf (2000b) as well as work by Larry Epstein ( ), Lars Hansen ( ), and Thomas 
Sargent ( )along these lines. 
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given the large volume of observed trading amongst agents. Heterogeneity and 
interaction of agents is important on an intuitive level, and thus cannot be ignored. 
We do not want to claim too much for this requirement. What is intuitively 
plausible is clearly an ambiguous criteria, and “intuitively plausible” is more effective at 
ruling out general models, than it is in choosing among them.  
 (2) Empirically relevant 
Science is about efficiently storing and summarizing patterns in data, and putting 
those patterns together to better understand, and possibly predict, patterns that otherwise 
would not be observable. Based on arguments such as Friedman’s F-twist, standard 
economics has emphasized the latter part of definition, and has focused on choosing 
whatever assumptions are necessary to best predict new patterns. Assumptions that 
predict “best” are the best assumptions. The problem is that empirically determining what 
predicts best is difficult, if not impossible, which has left standard economics free to use 
the holy trilogy with the argument that they predict as well as anything else.  
The complexity approach emphasizes the storing, or summarizing succinctly via 
devices such as scaling laws, as well as the predicting, aspect of the empirical 
foundations of science. It begins with determining standard outcomes of complex 
systems that occur independently of assumptions. Zipf’s Law, and other power laws, are 
examples; complex systems seem to generate certain outcomes that match the size 
distribution of cities and commodity price series. The existence of such standard 
outcomes has significant modeling and policy implications. If there are strong self-
organization forces that lead to data patterns independent of assumptions made about 
agents, then those assumptions don’t matter and deductive theory is irrelevant. 
Most economists working in complexity, including us, take the position that the 
forces of self-organization are not so overwhelmingly strong that deductive work is 
irrelevant. Insight into the patterns can be gained by studying the microfoundations of the 
complex system. The two approaches can complement one another. Agent based 
complexity models are designed to add further information; they take those predictions 
that follow independently of assumptions as a baseline prediction, and see what 
theoretically based models can add to that predictive power. The models are not totally 
deductive. As discussed above, since the assumptions used in these models generally 
cannot be judged by their predictive value, they need to reflect observed behavior-what 
people actually do.  
(3) Logically consistent with the data being modeled.  
  At this point precisely what simulations are adding to our understanding is a bit 
unclear. There is much work to be done in determining what inferences can be drawn 
from simulation work. Will it be limited to general understanding of the process, or will it 
be more specific? At the stage of development it does seem able to help us establish some 
minimal restrictions on allowable models. Much of the work in simulations is currently at 
this stage. For example, Joshua Epstein (1999) has suggested that a minimal requirement 
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of any “macroscopic explanandum” is that it can be generated by agents following the 
assumptions made in the model. This might be called the computable existence 
requirement. Work that has explored existence includes Epstein and Axtell (1996), 
Arthur et al. (1997) and Axelrod (1997). This existence requirement seems like a natural 
desideratum of a model. Its converse could also be a strong requirement of a model: If it 
can be proved that the assumptions of the model cannot generate the empirical results, 
then the model is unacceptable.  
Notice that the simulation has two roles in the complexity approach: (1) as a way 
of testing assumptions, and (2), as a way of inducing assumptions-growing systems and 
finding patterns that match patterns in nature consistent with those assumptions.  
(4) Consistent with the assumed information set of the researcher.  
Learning and expectations play key roles in any model of a complex system. Both 
raise important issues in model symmetry. A desirable requirement in any model is model 
symmetry -the compatibility of the expectations and learning behavior of agents with the 
underlying foundation of the model. Strong model symmetry requires that the 
assumptions one makes about one’s own knowledge of the model are consistent with the 
assumptions made about the learning behavior and expectations of the agents in the 
model. Rational expectations models reflect strong model symmetry with an economics 
of control framework, and is a reasonable requirement for applied policy models in 
standard welfare economics.  
In the complexity approach to welfare economics, rational expectations do not 
meet the strong model symmetry assumption. Since the complexity approach assumes 
less than full knowledge on the part of the researcher, to have a model meet the model 
symmetry assumption requires that we assume less than full knowledge on the part of the 
agents in the model. Much work remains to be done in determining precisely what set of 
assumptions that meet strong model symmetry are best, but, as a requirement, it seems 
highly desirable requirement to place on models. Sargent (1993), (1999) builds models 
that "back off" from pure rational expectations by replacing rational expectations agents 
with agents who act like the scientists who study them. These type of models satisfy 
model symmetry as we use the term above. 
One could also imagine building models of the Sargent (1993), (1999) type but 
where the agents are Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) types of statisticians rather than 
the more "frequentist" type statisticians in Sargent's models. An example of BMA work 
that could be used is in Brock, W., Durlauf, S., (2000b). It applies statistical techniques, 
such as Bayesian Model Averaging, to deal with cases where the model is not known and 
the data are allowed to convert prior assessments over members of a family of plausible 
models into posterior assessments. It attempts to incorporate the reporting of "model 
uncertainty" with "confidence intervals" thereby imbedding uncertainty into policy 
analysis. It is plausible to believe that agents living in a model are as uncertain about the 
true model of the economy they are co-creating as are the scientists studying the 
economy. The principle of model symmetry would argue for assuming that if the 
scientists are BMA then the agents in the model should also be BMA. 
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3) The nature of the policy goals considered would be broader.  
Economic applied policy today in large part focuses heavily on allocative 
efficiency to the exclusion of other goals. In principle, it is recognized that there is more 
to welfare theory than allocative efficiency, but, in applied policy practice, little concern 
is actually given to other goals. This focus is a legacy of the economics of control welfare 
approach that could only come to definitive conclusions for efficiency. The formal 
limitations of the economics of control welfare framework to applied policy work are 
well known; to logically derive policy directives from the set of carefully specified initial 
conditions to policy is difficult, and significant limitations must be placed on the policy 
directives as to what they mean. It is for that reason that the work focuses on efficiency. 
Consider Von Graaf’s (1963) conclusion to his celebrated study of welfare economics:  
..the possibility of building a useful and interesting theory of welfare 
economics-i.e. one which consists of something more than the barren 
formalisms typified by the marginal equivalencies of conventional theory 
is exceedingly small.  
It was criticisms such as Von Graaf’s that led economics to stop working on the barren 
formalisms in their applied work, and to take a looser approach to assumptions made in 
applied policy.  
In complexity welfare economics, the limitations of drawing specific policy 
conclusions are built into the structure of the initial policy thinking. Since one cannot 
even come to definitive conclusions about efficiency, it frees economics up to consider a 
broader range of issues. This does not mean that economics’ focus on allocative 
efficiency would be eliminated; it would just not be the exclusive focus, as it often 
currently is. For example, one would expect complexity economics to deal much more 
with moral questions, such as those raised by Sen (2000), the systemic creation of norms 
and tastes raising positional goods issues such as those raised by Frank, resilience and 
other systemic-existence issues, such as those raised by the work in ecology. These 
considerations would be given an equal footing with standard efficiency considerations. 
An example of the type of work we have in mind here is that done by the 
Resilience Network (Rnet), a group of ecologists and economists associated with the 
Beijer Institute of Sweden. They are unified by exploration of concepts of "resilience" 
where "resilience" refers to the ability of a system to restore itself when buffeted by 
shocks or, in the wider sense of the word, maintain its function after shocked. (See 
Holling (1997) or Holling, Gunderson, and Peterson (1997)).  
The Rnet approach to complexity uses dynamical systems theory and nonlinear 
control systems theory to study the locating of patterns of spatial and temporal 
"lumpiness," where "space" is interpreted in a wide sense. (See, for example, Holling's 
(1992) paper. This attempt to simplify complexity by application of spectral analysis in 
time and "space" in order to identify "clumps of high spectral power" is analogous to 
application of spectral analysis in macroeconomics to locate regions of high spectral 
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power, and is the type of work that must be done if the mathematics of complexity is to 
affect policy.  
The underlying mathematics is complicated, but the results can be reduced to a 
tool simple enough to be useful to policy makers. For example the log/log space/time 
scaling plot of Holling(1997, p. 356), called a Stommel plot, and the adaptive cycle 
diagram of Holling (1997, p.389), both could be used to suggest to policy makers how 
much focus they should give to equilibria shifts.  
Pedagogically, this broader view of welfare economics would change the way we 
present microeconomics. The existence of an externality would not be seen as an 
immediate call for policy action, since externalities would be seen as contextual to the 
model one is working with, not something that exists in the world. Indeed, complexity-
based thinking with its emphasis on such things as slow moving unobserved variables, 
and latent self organization potential causing "surprises", most likely would approach 
policy action on a perceived externality quite gingerly. Similarly, from this broader 
welfare perspective, the absence of externalities would not be seen as an argument for 
laissez faire. The complexity-based policy analyst, much like the Rnet analyst, would 
constantly be on the lookout for unpleasant "surprises" caused not only by observed 
spillovers left out by markets, but also unobserved slow moving uncosted spillovers that 
may lead to very unpleasant surprises (e.g. jumps in loss of environmental quality caused 
by bifurcations). In short, failures of market outcomes, as well as market failures, will be 
part of the policy analysis. 
4)The Nature of the Policy Solutions Would Change 
In the economics of control policy solutions involve getting the economy to the 
“right price.” In muddling through, there is no right price; policy solutions involve 
finding a “right”, or at least acceptable, process. This means that policy work is more 
focused on institutional issues-designing institutions that are generally lead to desirable 
ends. Examples of right process solutions can be seen in Scott’s Seeing Like a State 
(1998). This process view of policy gives one a different perspective on the nature of 
competition and the desirability of the market than does standard welfare economics. The 
market is a desirable institution not only because it leads to efficient results, but also 
because it is resilient; it allows for the change that is necessary in a complex evolving 
system. But the market that does this is seen as a real world institution, not as an abstract 
ideal, and arguments as to whether intervention into the market process is or is not 
desirable would have to be made contextually, in reference to the actual institutions, not 
theoretically, in reference to a hypothesized state of perfect competition.  
The muddling through approach sees the policy process as a complex system in 
which any researcher is seen as part of the process, not the entire process. Thus, it would 
not see economists arriving at policy recommendations alone (even in principle); instead 
it would see economists as part of an integrated regulatory approach that uses economics, 
but is not fully directed by economics. In this approach economists provide advice both 
in the form of benefit cost/analysis and mechanism design analysis. This would 
especially be so on issues where preferences of economics agents are likely to be altered 
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by participation in a mutually respectful interactive educative process like an idealized 
town meeting "teach-in".  
Some policy commentators (e.g. Farber (1999)) argue that components of 
preferences that are invariant to such mutually educative interactive exchange processes 
should loom much larger in policy weightings (i.e. almost lexicographical) relative to 
components of preferences measured by standard economics-based methods such as 
benefit/cost analysis as conventionally applied. Notice how "complexity-based" our 
interpretation of Farber is--i.e. his "educative process invariant" components of tastes are 
"emergent properties" of his idealized interactive political decision process.  
The result of taking a complexity approach to policy would be a combining of the 
expertise of economists, scientists and lawyers and a mixed approach to regulation. That 
mixed approach would contain elements from measures of willingness to pay, but it 
would also have measures of “willingness-to vote.” It would back away from approaches 
that only consider benefit/cost analysis, but it also would nonetheless respect the 
efficiency goals embodied in the benefit/cost movement. It would see the political sphere 
as a dynamic uniquely deliberative evolver of value systems that have a higher claim for 
representation in an over-all “value calculus” than private preferences. 
This change would lead to some changes in regulatory processes. For example, in 
environmental regulation we believe there would be more focus on devices such as 
regulatory tiering, separation of users, "smart markets", and treatment of chunks of the 
ecosystem as Tieboutian local public goods, as ways of reducing the impact of the 
"fumbling fist" of the State and, perhaps, reducing some of the public resistance to 
environmental regulation.  
Complexity-based methods, by focusing more on the surprise potential contained 
in self organization of large complex adaptive systems, would direct policy in a manner 
that would take care in designing institutions, i.e. changes in the "rules-of-the-game" to 
avoid rent seeking behavior. It would, as Magee and Brock argued (Colander, 1984) try 
to design economic institutions to reward invisible hand behavior more than invisible 
foot behavior. It would work hard to avoid wasteful policies put in place by narrow 
special interest "rent seeking" groups where the benefits to such groups are less than the 
cost to society as a whole. The reality is that many attempts at institutional design end up 
generating unpleasant surprises in the form of stimulating the self organization of such 
"rent seeking" groups. A focus of complexity based policy research would be on ways of 
structuring incentives for groups of agents to self organize in order to produce useful 
goods and services for society at large rather than self organizing to extract wealth 
through the use of the state.  
Another change in the type of policy solution would follow from the broadening 
of the goals discussed above. The greater focus on norm creation would also change the 
nature of policy solutions considered. For example, reducing positional consumption 
races caused conspicuous consumption of winners of "winner-take-all" markets which 
was stressed by Frank and Cook (1995) and amplified by Frank (1999) would likely be 
more emphasized. Since the total volume of consumption pressure generated by lower 
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strata of society is so huge (even relative to that of the top strata), this kind of "renorming 
from the top down" could have enormous impact. This is so because the rarified rich are 
tiny in population and even their total volume of consumption is small relative to the total 
volume of consumption of the classes below them. 
One can only imagine the alteration of behavior that might take place if the talent 
of Madison Avenue were applied to educate consumers to generate behavior that 
minimized the load on the environment. It is easy to imagine the revenues from 
appropriate externality taxes would be large enough to fund potent ad campaigns.  
We fully recognize that care must be taken in making any of these arguments, but 
the small discussion given to it relative to its potential importance suggests to us that 
more intensive consideration of such issues by economists would be a worthwhile 
applied policy investment.  
Conclusions 
  Our discussion has been wide-ranging and highly preliminary. We do not want to 
claim too much for it, of for how any of the propositions offered directly follow from 
taking a complexity perspective. However, we believe that the topics are important, and 
are too little discussed by economists. Moreover, we recognize that many of the changes 
in method currently occurring in the profession, changes which are moving in the 
muddling through direction, would probably be made even if complexity had never been 
developed. There is a natural tendency of systems to muddle through and arrive at 
reasonable approaches on their own, and that has been the case in applied economic 
research, where the applied work had deviated significantly from its theoretical welfare 
foundations.  
  Our hope is that by highlighting the discord between the welfare theory we teach, 
and the actual practice of applied policy economics, researchers will become more 
conscious of the pragmatic approach they are taking, and embrace it, and develop it 
further, rather than reluctantly use it.  
Economics often considers itself the queen of the social sciences. Its coronation 
has been associated with its formal scientific nature, it’s consistency of approach, its 
certainty in its applied policy suggestions, and its empirical nature. Each of those 
elements is closely tied to the holy trilogy of assumptions, which gives an almost 
religious nature to the monarchy. It is this connection that accounts for why the core 
general equilibrium theory has remained the center of welfare economics, even as applied 
policy work moved away from those assumptions. There was fear that if we give up the 
holy trilogy we will give up our reign. That need not be true. However, if muddling 
through is accepted as the best we can do with welfare economics, then the economic 
profession’s claim to being the queen cannot be a religious claim, as the holy trilogy 
analogy suggests it is by some researchers. Instead it would be a secular claim based on 
its usefulness in arriving at reasonable and workable policy solutions to the difficult 
policy problems we face.  
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